

Patterns of Information Disorder and the 2022 Philippine Elections

Janet S. Tibaldo, LPT, Ph. D.

Professor, Department of Languages and Communication, Saint Louis University, Baguio City, Philippines
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7298-2483>
jtibaldo@slu.edu.ph

Jules Philip G. Tillay

College Instructor, Department of Languages and Communication, Saint Louis University, Baguio City, Philippines

ABSTRACT

The overwhelming amount of information disorder across social media poses a challenge for Filipinos, even during elections. It is a force to be reckoned with in the Philippine landscape. This study sought to address the seeming lack of literature about election-related information disorder in social media. This study aims to analyze media texts about the 2022 Philippine presidential candidates collected from Philippine-based fact-checkers, including those from the International Fact-Checking Network or IFCN- verified signatories, legacy media, academia, and civil society. Using conceptual content analysis, the fact-checked media texts were examined and coded to determine the dominant patterns of information disorder types, persuasion mode, format, platform, source, and keywords.

The study surfaced that disinformation is the most dominant type of information disorder. It also revealed that most fact-checked media texts contain misleading content, usually in the form of text and images. Additionally, information disorder peddlers use pathos as a way of persuading social media users, particularly on Facebook, YouTube, and Tiktok. It is also found that a significant number of the media texts are mostly from user-generated pages, sites, or channels that are constructed as a direct attack on a candidate or a party.

Keywords: *elections, fact-checking, media and information literacy, political disinformation*

Introduction

Wardle (2019) defines information disorder as a collective term that encompasses three main types namely: malinformation, misinformation, and disinformation. Misinformation refers to false content that is not intended to cause harm while malinformation pertains to authentic information used to inflict harm. Disinformation covers content that is both intended to be false and harmful. These three classifications were used in the studies of Chua et al. (2018), Damasceno (2021), and Ong and Cabañes (2018).

Furthermore, Wardle (2019) identified these seven common types of misinformation and disinformation as (1) Satire/parody which is utilized for comedic commentaries on social issues but has the potential to be taken seriously over time to the extent that people choose to believe in it, (2) False Connection or clickbait content which involves sensational writing of headlines or captions that do not match the attached content to attract more audience, (3) Misleading Content which pertains to information that is used to frame a situation or a person, (4) False Context or content that is truthful but with untrue contextual information, (5) Imposter Content is committed when an identity of a well-known brand or personality is used along with false content, (6) Manipulated Content which involves the use of tampered legitimate content taken from genuine sources, and (7) Fabricated Content which pertains to completely fabricated materials to present content that never took place.

Wardle and Derakhshan (2018) state that the global crisis of information disorder goes beyond the coverage of the term, “fake news”, and that it even extends to trolling and computational propaganda. Many foreign scholars have documented manipulative digital strategies, as seen in the psychographic Facebook experiments of Cambridge Analytica (Graham-Harrison & Cadwalladr, 2021; Ireton & Posetti, 2018), and the Russian trolls’ targeted Twitter attacks against Western countries (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

Information Disorder and Presidential Elections in the Americas

Americans were exposed to various disinformation across social media platforms during the 2016 elections in the United States (Hughes & Waismel-Manor, 2021) with Facebook and Twitter (Bovet & Makse, 2018) as their main sources. Furthermore, Howard & Bolsover (2018) and Shao et al. (2018) found that automated accounts in social media were utilized to disseminate rumors on politics, and false news, and to direct US voters to visit political news sites.

A 2018 study by Howard, Woolley, and Calo, revealed that a significant portion of the national candidates' social media followers were found to be highly automated. The said study also cited three instances wherein bots impacted campaign practices, particularly: (1) zombie electioneering (2) coordination of complex campaign strategies, and (3) solicitation of donations. In addition, polarization within American communities has also been evident in the consumption of news (Schmidt et al., 2017). Despite this, Bovet and Makse (2018) suggest that false news stories favored Trump over Clinton.

In the 2018 Brazilian Presidential elections, the campaign of Jair Bolsonaro, now Brazilian president, was improved by utilizing propaganda (Hunter & Power, 2019). Propaganda devices used were in the form of sock puppets, cyborgs, social media trolls, and bots to enhance his presence (Santini et al., 2021). Santini et al. (2021) stated that these political messages across social media take advantage of profound social agitations, such as diminishing trust in institutions, fragmented societal bonds, and democratic processes. Despite having the support from mainstream media for his political campaign (Decker et al., 2019, as cited in Santini, et al., 2021), social media was the main medium that Bolsonaro used in his political marketing, particularly in WhatsApp (Campos Mello, 2018, as cited in Santini et al., 2021).

Information Disorder and Presidential Elections in Asia

In Asia, information disorder is rampant as deceitful news, fabricated content, false claims, political propaganda, and other means of information manipulation flourish (Chua et al., 2018). These cases of disinformation among Asian countries like Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan are evident in various studies.

In South Korea, one case of political disinformation involves the 2016 president Park Geun-hye who was accused of taking advantage of her power to solicit bribes from some of the largest companies in the country. With the corruption scandal, Park’s administration started to spread partisan and fabricated

information on online platforms and newspaper-like pamphlets like News Town, No Cut Ilbe, and FreedomNews.

Another disinformation case occurred during the 2018 Taiwan elections when the Democratic Progressive Party mayoral candidate Chen Chi-Mei denounced a Facebook account belonging to "Li Ronggui" for posting inaccurate claims regarding him and his previous cronies. About this, several online news articles intended to tarnish Chen's image were reported by the police (Wang, 2020).

Information Disorder and Presidential Elections in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the end of the 20th century marked the emergence of internet usage (Teehankee, 2012). With this, various candidates, individuals, and other organizations began to educate voters through the Internet (Teehankee, 2012). According to Teehankee (2012), the electoral campaign in the 1998 elections witnessed the use of the Internet, marked by the creation of sites that centered around the candidates. However, the websites quickly disappeared from the Internet because of scarce efforts to maintain them. One factor that the political websites disappeared is the lack of Internet users in the Philippines. According to a graphic presented by Teehankee (2012), from 1998 to 2001, there were only 2,000,000 Internet users, which is just 2.7% of the 34-36 million registered voters at that time. Since there are only a portion of the Philippines' Internet users, political parties and organizations use traditional mainstream media, such as television, radio, and print to campaign for candidates.

It was not until the 2010 Presidential elections that cyber campaigning was used by political parties and organizations (Mirandilla-Santos, 2009). Cyber campaigning, which is powered by the Internet, deviates from the traditional "one-to-many" communication because it allows people, whether voters or campaign organizations, to produce and receive information through social media sites (Mirandilla-Santos, 2009). With this shift from traditional to new media, politicians began to use these platforms and even created websites and blogs as public opinion surfaced particularly on Facebook and YouTube (Pertierra, 2012).

Social media campaigning was already being practiced as early as the 2010 Philippine Presidential Elections. Letargo (2010) of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) noted that the 2010 Philippine presidential aspirants were motivated by Obama's phenomenal online campaign and utilized Facebook as a medium to campaign. By March 2010, over 10 million Filipinos had already signed up on the platform (Cruz, 2010). The rising number of Facebook users was taken advantage of by the then-leading presidential candidates Benigno Aquino III and Manuel Villar. Both camps have had paid advertisements and launched propaganda campaigns on social media, while their Facebook pages suffered from troll invasions (Letargo, 2010). In addition, Gutierrez (2018) reported in a Rappler article that Cambridge Analytica, an international private firm, claimed to have "won" the presidential elections in 2010 wherein Aquino emerged as the winner.

In 2016, online disinformation in the Philippines increased greatly, specifically in the activity of political supporters. According to Chua and Labiste (2018), President Rodrigo Duterte admitted that he spent US\$200,000 on social media as part of his campaign. The scholars also surfaced that one of Duterte's campaign managers stated that the money was used to recruit 400 to 500 volunteers who have a large audience; these volunteers, named Duterte's "keyboard army", were paid from USD 10 to 60 a day for their copy-and-paste services. Avedano (2018) highlights that many fake social media accounts associated with now President Rodrigo Duterte's 2016 electoral campaign were uncovered by Rappler, a news website. Hence, it is quite evident that information disorder has impacted public opinion, caused conflict between individuals and groups, and even elevated undeserving persons to positions of power.

In the 2021 Philippine Association of Communication Educators (PACE) webinar, resource speaker, Ron Jabal, argued that voters nowadays involve themselves in loud, heated discussions where facts and news are usually disregarded. Additionally, Jabal pointed out that these situations paved the way for the rise of “basta” voters, describing those who are unable to provide logical justifications for their political ideas.

At the onset of the 2022 election season, even before the official start of the campaign period, misleading and disinformation content had already surfaced in social media (Garcia, 2021; Mendoza, 2019; Vera Files, 2021; Villanueva, 2021).

Meanwhile, Filipino researchers Ong and Cabañes (2018) surfaced the “architects of networked disinformation” in the Philippines, and documented the working conditions and motivations of several troll operators in the country. Due to the pandemic, authorities and professors predicted that the 2022 National Elections will be different from other elections. With the pandemic-related protocols, political operators, according to Ateneo De Manila Political Science professor Arjan Aguirre, are expected to be “more subtle” in giving bribes while candidates will be compelled to reallocate funds to cyber operations for their campaigns (Domingo, 2021).

For instance, rumors about the disqualification issue of Vice President Leni Robredo for the 2022 National elections arose but were clarified by Commission on Elections spokesperson James Jimenez as false (Garcia, 2021). Meanwhile, misleading images of establishments illuminated in pink surfaced as thousands of netizens continued to share these while believing that these signified support to Vice President Leni Robredo. However, it was taken two years ago as an expression of support for breast cancer awareness and a part of a nightly show (Vera Files, 2021).

Moreover, the Marcoses' attempts to return to Philippine politics are linked to mass social media propaganda, with various contents focusing on the denial of Martial Law abuses and the magnification of Marcos's achievements (Mendoza, 2019). However, in an October 21 interview with Erwin Tulfo, presidential aspirant Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. denied ever using trolls and social media boosts as his supporters are “real.” False and misleading information about the Marcos family has continuously circulated across social media (Villanueva, 2021).

Accordingly, even Senator Panfilo Lacson and his running mate, Senate President Vicente Sotto III, were marred with rumors of disqualification. Patag (2021) of Philippine Star checked two contents from the YouTube channel “Banat Trending News” claiming that Senate President Vicente “Tito” Sotto III and Sen. Panfilo Lacson backed out even before the beginning of the campaign season. The two videos gained a combined total of 250,000 views as of September 27.

Similarly, there was also a video claiming that the candidacy of Senator Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquiao was canceled. Vera Files (2021) deemed this as false because it was a “mere spin-off on current events”, amid an ongoing debacle that prompted PDP-Laban to divide into two factions. In two consecutive posts published on September 13 and 24, the Facebook pages Duterte 2016 Bohol Movement and Yellow Army spread fake quote cards, stating that Manila City Mayor Francisco “Isko Moreno” Domagoso made discriminatory statements against people from the Visayas and Mindanao (Vera Files, 2021).

Fact-checkers in the Philippines

The International Fact-Checking Network or the IFCN enlists Rappler, Vera Files, and Agence France-Presse (AFP) Philippines as signatories in their Code of Principles. The IFCN designates an eligible signatory status to an organization based on five principles namely: (1) a commitment to Non-partisanship and Fairness, (2) a commitment to Standards and Transparency of Sources, (3) A commitment to Transparency of Funding

and Organization (4) a commitment to Standards and Transparency of Methodology, and (5) a commitment to an Open and Honest Corrections Policy.

According to its official website, Rappler conducts both external and internal fact-checking processes. Rappler fact-checks their reports based on their own Editorial Policies and a multilevel verification system called "Newsbreak", and crowdsources information from external sources by encouraging online communities to submit "dubious" claims (Rappler, 2017). In addition, Rappler considers the following elements in their fact-checking prioritization: (1) verifiability of the information, (2) relevance to the public, (3) potential harm to the subject/s, and (4) potential virality (Rappler, 2017).

With two fact-checking programs, Vera Files conducts fact-checking for misleading public statements and contributes to Facebook's initiatives to stop the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation (Vera Files, 2021). In addition, Vera Files adopts a unified 7-point rating system. This rating system includes the following terms: (1) 'Fake' is for totally fabricated information, (2) 'False' is for claims that refute laws, official records, and studies, (3) 'Misleading' is for claims that, even when based on records of truth, are intently distorted to convey another meaning, (4) "Unproven/No basis" is for claims that do not have concrete evidence, (5) 'Inaccurate' is for claims that have errors in numerical data, time and dates (6) 'Needs Context' is for claims that do not have sufficient context which might potentially mislead readers, and (7) 'Flip-Flop' is for the abrupt changes on a public official's stand on certain issues.

Similar to Vera Files, Agence France-Presse (AFP) Philippines has also been recognized as a third-party Facebook fact checker apart from being an IFCN signatory. AFP Philippines utilizes many publicly available tools such as Google Maps, and Reverse Image Searching, and co-developed a browser extension called InVID/WeVerify which focuses on debunking false video content.

Local legacy media outfits such as The Philippine Star created a separate section for independent fact checks on its official website. The Philippine Star has previously joined Tsek.ph, a fact-checking initiative for the 2019 Midterm Elections, which was formed by other news organizations such as ABS-CBN Integrated News and Current Affairs, Rappler, Vera Files, Baguio Midland Courier, MindaNews and others. Furthermore, an independent civic society group called Fact Check Philippines was also founded in 2017. According to its official Facebook Page, Fact Check Philippines is "the country's first established citizen fact-checking organization." In academia, FactRaker was also established by students of the University of the Philippines (UP)-Diliman under the supervision of Associate Professors Yvonne Chua and Ma. Diosa Labiste (FactRakers, n.d.). Based on its official website, FactRakers has appropriated the ratings of Tsek.ph which include the following: (1) "Accurate" denotes that a statement is factually correct (2) "False" denotes that a statement contradicts existing facts (3) "Misleading" denotes that a statement is ambiguous and conveys a different meaning (4) "Needs Context" denotes that a statement requires more factual information and explanation (5) "No basis" denotes that a statement is not verifiable.

While there is local and international literature on information disorder, there is a seeming lack of studies that look into the types of election-related information disorder across social media. Though many fact-checkers evaluate information disorders that are shared online, the classifications are quite limited as they cater to the masses as their primary target audience. Hence, this study will analyze information disorder in the context of the 2022 Philippines.

National Elections, specifically those that involve the presidential candidates who have already been fact-checked by the International Fact-Checking Network or IFCN signatories based in the Philippines, legacy media, the academia, and the civil society.

Specifically, this study aims to answer the following questions:

1. What dominant type of information disorder can be surfaced in the media texts fact-checked by various fact-checking organizations about the 2022 Philippine presidential candidates?
2. What dominant patterns are manifested as regards:
 - a. Mis- and disinformation type
 - b. Persuasion Mode
 - c. Format
 - d. Platform
 - e. Source
 - f. Keywords

Methodology

This study used conceptual content analysis which is described as an analysis method involving quantifying and tallying the frequency of occurrence of concepts represented in a text (Palmquist et al., 2020). Nayak and Dharmanna (2021) define content analysis as a technique for interpreting communication artifacts and multimedia and textual data.

Inclusion Criteria

This study only included media texts fact-checked by (1) IFCN-verified signatories based in the Philippines: AFP Philippines, Vera Files, and Rappler, (2) legacy media: Philstar.com, (3) Academia: FactRakers, and (4) civil society: Fact Check Philippines. The media texts also included those concerning official presidential candidates for 2021 starting from the day 1 of the filing of the certificate of candidacy for national positions on October 1, 2021, up until the end of March 2022. Information Disorder was framed using Wardle's (2019) frame of mis-, dis- and malinformation.

Exclusion Criteria

Media texts from presidential candidates declared by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as nuisance candidates, candidates who officially withdrew their COCs, and media texts from the fact-checkers that surfaced before October 1, 2021, were excluded from the study.

Data Gathering and Procedure

The researchers gathered data by looking into all media texts appertaining official candidates who ran for the presidential position in the 2022 Philippine national election that was already fact-checked by AFP Philippines, Vera Files, Rappler, Philstar.com, FactRakers, and Fact Check Philippines.

Using Claire Wardle's information disorder frame, the media texts were analyzed and coded. Dominant patterns that emerged in the corpus of data based on the (a) specific type of mis- and disinformation (b) persuasion mode (c) format used (d) platform the media text is found (e) source or creator/publisher of the media text and (f) keywords were also be identified.

In addition, an "Omnibus" code was added to categorize fact-checked media texts linked to two or more candidates. Duplicates across fact-checkers were also analyzed to see if there were discrepancies in terms of their disinformation classification.

For the treatment of data, a frequency table was used to account for the number of times a specific data has occurred across all the tables. Percentage and Frequency Distribution were used for the summary of data. These were used to find out the emerging patterns across all the fact-checked media texts.

Ethical Consideration

To mitigate researcher bias in the coding and analyzing process, the study employed peer data checking and researcher reflexivity, or the ability of the researcher to consciously reflect on their position in relation to the creation of knowledge regarding research subjects (Roulston, 2010, p.116).

Results and Discussion

The dominant type of information disorder that surfaced in the media texts fact-checked by various fact-checking organizations about the 2022 Philippine presidential candidates is Disinformation as seen in Table 1. This means that most fact-checked media texts are created with the intention to be false and to cause harm.

Table 1. *Type of Information Disorder*

	Misinformation	Disinformation	Malinformation	Total
Domagoso	7	9		16
Lacson	3	3		6
Marcos	192	204		396
Pacquiao	5	3		8
Robredo	146	263		409
Omnibus	39	18		57
Total	392	500		892

**Omnibus = media text fact-checked has 2 or more candidates in it*

With the 892 gathered media texts from the 6 fact check initiatives, disinformation prevailed with a total of 500, followed by misinformation with 392 media texts. As for malinformation, there were no recorded media texts since the researchers solely categorized the data based on Wardle's seven types of mis- and disinformation.

The majority of the disinformation attacks were directed at Vice President Leni Robredo while former senator Ferdinand Marcos Jr. had the most dominant amount of misinformation. Robredo also garnered the highest number of fact-checked media texts with a sum of 409 data.

A study by Tsek.ph (2022) which has been reported by legacy media like Rappler, Philstar, ABS-CBN, and GMA, found that Robredo is the main target of disinformation with negative messaging, whereas Marcos is the biggest beneficiary of disinformation with positive messaging. In an Al Jazeera article by Beltran (2022), Ateneo De Manila historian Francis Gealogo argues that disinformation regarding Marcos Jr. predominantly portrays him in a favorable position, and his and the achievements of his father, late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., are frequently exaggerated. Aside from this, Rappler's Sharktank database also revealed common themes found in Marcos' disinformation machinery such as justifying the family's ill-gotten wealth, repudiating human rights abuses and corruption during Marcos's regime, and demonizing media networks.

Robredo has been vilified by disinformation campaigns since she was inaugurated as vice president in 2016. As Table 1 shows, Robredo is the most-targeted public figure of election-related disinformation among the presidential candidates, with 263 fact-checked media texts linked to her. The common themes of falsehood surrounding Robredo that surfaced in the survey, range from her current position as vice president to her political stand on key issues. This is corroborated by Tsek.ph's report on electoral misinformation, of

which disinformation propagators portray her as intellectually inferior by distorting her views on various topics.

Table 2. *Specific mis- and disinformation type*

Candidates	Misinformation			Disinformation				Total
	<i>False Connection</i>	<i>Misleading Content</i>	<i>Satire or Parody</i>	<i>False Context</i>	<i>Imposter Content</i>	<i>Manipulated Content</i>	<i>Fabricated Content</i>	
Domagoso	0	7	0	4	0	3	2	16
Lacson	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	6
Marcos	7	161	24	53	3	50	98	396
Pacquiao	0	5	0	0	0	1	2	8
Robredo	7	121	18	55	6	83	119	409
Omnibus	0	32	7	2	0	10	6	57
Total	14	329	49	116	9	147	228	892

The table above shows a high amount of misleading media texts made to deceive for political or economic benefit (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017) circulating during the election season. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) further revealed that during the 2016 US presidential campaign, 30 million misleading media texts were deemed beneficial for Donald Trump, compared to 8 million media texts possibly beneficial for Hillary Clinton. Shao et al. (2018) provided evidence of the "important role of robots in the widespread distribution of fake news (p.2)" on social media during the height of the US election. Calero (2018) as cited in Rodríguez-Fernández (2019) found that agencies use trolls and bots to enforce the dissemination of these harmful contents to influence the outcome of the presidential elections.

It is alarming that the number of disinformation is higher than misinformation, one sign that political groups are launching disinformation campaigns during the election season. It should be noted that out of 892 media texts fact-checked, 805 (90.25%) are linked to the presidential race frontrunners, ex-senator Marcos Jr. and Vice President Robredo. Marcos Jr. has been linked with the highest amount of media texts with misinformation, while Robredo was related with the highest amount of disinformation, a situation where Robredo takes a disadvantage. This was also revealed in the study of Ribeiro (2018) as cited in Rodríguez-Fernández (2019) that disinformation has helped the candidate less affected by it to win the polls, in foreign presidential elections.

Table 3. *Persuasion Mode*

Candidates	Ethos	Logos	Pathos	Total
Domagoso	8	3	5	16
Lacson	2	4	0	6
Marcos	125	146	125	396
Pacquiao	4	4	0	8
Robredo	154	75	180	409
Omnibus	25	10	22	57
Total	318	242	332	892

According to Sample et al. (2020), among the three, 'pathos' is deemed the most effective in political propaganda as it involves the appeal to emotions, particularly hope (Menz, 2009) and fear (Montgomery, 2017). This is seen in the results, with Pathos having the highest persuasion mode. This concludes that it is the most used in the analysis of political discourses, particularly for presidential candidates Leni Robredo and

Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. However, as for Presidential candidates Manny Pacquiao and Panfilo Lacson, Pathos was not utilized.

From the table, it can be inferred that information disorder peddlers mostly use Pathos as a strategy for conveying information while capitalizing on the emotions of social media users, bypassing logic and rational thinking (Sample et al., 2020).

There are over 925 formats from the gathered media texts across the six fact-checkers as seen in Table 4. This is not equivalent to the overall total of 892 media texts because (1) there is often more than one format used in a single media text, and (2) a single media text often has several platforms containing multiple formats.

Table 4. *Format*

Candidates	Image	Image, Text	Video	Video, Text	Quote Card	Format not specified	Other	Total
Domagoso	1	1	11	1	1	1	2	18
Lacson	0	1	2	1	0	0	2	6
Marcos	28	114	80	54	35	3	92	406
Pacquiao	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	6
Robredo	29	141	62	58	48	1	94	433
Omnibus	0	17	7	14	2	1	15	56
Total	58	274	163	131	86	6	207	925

In a fact-checked article by Vera Files (2021), an instance proving Filipinos' susceptibility to be misled by images and by their context includes continuous sharing of images of buildings in pink claiming or seeming to support presidential candidate Vice President Leni Robredo only to be of false interpretation.

Videos have also been utilized to make people believe that Sen. Panfilo Lacson and Senate President Vicente Sotto III have backed out as election candidates which proves to be false (Patag, 2021). As recently reported in Digital 2022, specifically in the Philippines, netizens have become more engaged with watching a variety of videos. 98.4% are any kind of video; 35.9% are live streams; 60.4% are videos by influencers; and 65.2% are comedy/meme and viral videos (Kemp, 2022).

Table 5. *Platform*

	Facebook	YouTube	Twitter	Instagram	Tiktok	Platform not specified	Other	Total
Domagoso	5	2	1	0	3	2	4	17
Lacson	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	7
Marcos	272	58	10	0	40	22	18	420
Pacquiao	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	8
Robredo	305	31	25	6	19	20	28	434
Omnibus	41	9	2	0	3	4	1	60
Total	629	105	38	6	66	50	52	946

With 629 fact-checked media texts, Facebook tops the seven platforms that have the most fact-checked media text. YouTube comes in second with a total of 105 while TikTok is in third with 66 total. This

coincides with the Digital 2022: The Philippines report where 96.2 % use Facebook, 75.7% use Instagram, and 67.9% use TikTok (Kemp, 2022). Jabal, during the Politics of Scream webinar of PACE Inc. (2021), also revealed that Facebook and TikTok are used as platforms for information disorder.

There is also the rise of the Meta-partisan news ecosystems on YouTube acting as legitimate news channels to influence the upcoming 2022 Philippine elections (Bernido, 2022). The scope of the empirical experiment neither confirms nor denies that these 'news' films are deemed 'news,' but it emphasizes the point about the increasingly hazy meanings of 'news' in today's media context.

Dominant Patterns: Sources

In finding the emerging patterns of the sources within the fact-checked media texts, there were 428 fact-checked media texts considered coming from User-generated pages or channels; 195 of which are linked to former senator Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. User-generated pages or channels deliberately share disinformation to manipulate and take advantage off from its audience. These findings are corroborated by Rappler's Sharktank which monitored over 360 public pages promoting and supporting the Marcos family (Mendoza, 2019).

Dominant Patterns: Keywords

Two-hundred seventy three (273) fact-checked media texts were considered Direct Attacks on Candidate or Party, and 206 of which are linked to Vice President Robredo. Most fact-checked media about Robredo include derogatory terms such as "bobo", "lugaw" and "lutang." Red-tagging phrases such as "terrorista" and "NPA" are also prevalent. These findings correlate to a February 2022 study published by Tsek.ph that revealed that Robredo is the "biggest victim" of social media disinformation.

Significantly, 110 fact-checked media texts have been coded as Historical Revisionism 108 of which are linked to Marcos Jr. Examples aligned with Historical Revisionism include posts claiming that the Marcoses have zero records of ill-gotten wealth. In addition, there were several media texts about infrastructure that were falsely attributed to Marcos Sr such as the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. While keywords within the claims are about Marcos Jr.'s namesake and former president Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the use of hashtags such as "#BBM2022" or "#BringBackMarcos" is prevalent. Several fact-checked media texts also include claims that attempt to clear Marcos Jr. from any of his family's records of unpaid taxes and ill-gotten wealth. In an article in Rappler, Tomacruz (2020) revealed that, according to Brittany Kaiser who is a former employee of Cambridge Analytica, the Marcoses had previously reached out to the public relations firm to "rebrand" the family's image.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite the existence of established fact-checkers across the Philippines, there is still a plethora of information disorder, especially disinformation, spreading across social media. This study surfaced that disinformation is brought by curated posts that are intended to be false and harmful. Alongside the rise of disinformation is the prevalence of direct attacks on candidates and the deliberate use of emotional appeals within political narratives in media texts. It is not enough for Filipinos to just be knowledgeable in fact-checking, they must also push back against the "architects of networked disinformation" and actively participate in relevant discourse that elevates informed citizenry of a robust democracy.

In a country that has been labeled the social media and text capital of the world, this study provides specific information disorder patterns during a national election, with the pandemic as a backdrop. The results will contribute to communication professionals and media practitioners in addressing and mitigating

information disorder. It will also provide relevant data in improving or enhancing Filipinos' media and information literacy and encourage critical thinking. The study will also allow voters not only to be aware of networked disinformation but

Also make them responsible prosumers and ethical decision-makers. As information disorder is also observed even in some first-world countries, this study may provide a portrait of political disinformation's impact on a gullible society.

This current study bears several limitations. One key limitation is the scope of the months covered in the analysis of media texts that were fact-checked, as our study only covered starting from the presidential candidates' filing of COCs up until March 31, 2022, while the election day is on May 9, 2022. Future researchers may consider analyzing fact-checked media texts months or even years before the filing of COCs.

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